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ABSTRACT
Analysis of Large Embankment Dam in Case of Rapid Drawdown and Earthquake
Aftershock
by
Pothikul Vivithkeyoonvong, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2021

Major Professor: Dr. James A. Bay
Department: Civil and Environmental Engineering

Dams and reservoirs are important as a source of freshwater as well as for
regulating flooding and producing hydroelectricity. The same as with any other
manmade structure, dams need to monitored and maintained to prevent disastrous
failure.
One of the events that can reduce the stability of an embankment dam is rapid
drawdown. Rapid drawdown is when the water level decreases at such a rapid rate that
the dam material(s) cannot drain and adjust to the equilibrium in time. Without the
buttressing effect of the water, the upstream slope of the dam becomes less stable.
Another threat to dam stability is earthquake shakings. Strong seismic events can cause
damage to dams and appurtenant structures.
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the stability of large embankment
dam in the event of rapid drawdown and aftershock loading at the same time. The slope
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stability analysis is run in the program GeoStudio 2020. Sirikit Dam is used for the
analyses. The dam geometry and materials properties used are a combination of
existing data, reasonable estimation, Stark and Hussain’s (2013) empirical correlation for
drained fully softened secant friction angle, and engineering judgment.
The method for analyzing slope stability during rapid drawdown in this research
is the multi-stage rapid drawdown analysis proposed by Duncan, Wright, and Wong
(1990).
Seismicity data for the two active faults in the area are from a U.S. Geological
Survey report, Thailand’s Department of Mineral Resources, and Thailand’s
Meteorological Department. Maximum moment magnitude of each earthquake source
is estimated from these data. Using Bath’s Law, the largest aftershock magnitude is
estimated. Maximum peak ground acceleration (PGA) is estimated from the NGA-West2
ground motion prediction equations (GMPEs) model. Horizontal seismic coefficients (kh)
are determined from PGA and applied in the SLOPE/W slope analysis in GeoStudio.
The results of this study show that this mode of failure should be considered for
embankment dams. The analyses results shows that Sirikit Dam outperforms the
required factors of safety in the largest possible event of rapid drawdown and
aftershock. This method of analysis can be extended to other embankment dams.
Further research could estimate the probability of this event.

(119 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Analysis of Large Embankment Dam in Case of Rapid Drawdown and Earthquake
Aftershock
Pothikul Vivithkeyoonvong

Dams and reservoirs are important as a source of freshwater as well as
for regulating flooding and producing hydroelectricity. The same as with any other
manmade structure, dams need to monitored and maintained to prevent disastrous
failure.
One of the events that can reduce the stability of an embankment dam is rapid
drawdown. Rapid drawdown is when the water level decreases at such a rapid rate that
the dam material(s) cannot drain and adjust to the change in time. Without the
buttressing effect of the water, the upstream slope of the dam becomes less stable.
Another threat to dam stability is earthquake shakings. Strong seismic event can cause
damage to dams and appurtenant structures.
The analysis is run in the program GeoStudio 2020 using existing data,
reasonable estimation, well-accepted theories, and engineering judgment.
The results of this study show that this mode of failure should be considered for
embankment dams. The analyses results shows that Sirikit Dam outperforms the
required factors of safety in the largest possible event of rapid drawdown and
aftershock. This method of analysis can be extended to other embankment dams.
Further research could estimate the probability of this event.
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Disclaimer
The purpose of this research was to assess the viability of a dam failure mode
involving the combination of rapid drawdown and seismic loading due to an earthquake
aftershock, and to determine methods and procedures to evaluate this failure mode.
The analyses required to assess this failure mode were performed on Sirikit (SRK) Dam.
To perform these analyses, we relied on data and material properties developed and
published by others, that we could not verify. Furthermore, there is no record of other
material properties required for these analyses. Lacking actual measurements of
material properties, reasonable assumptions were made, that would be consistent with
typical properties of materials used in a well-constructed earth dam.
While this research did not raise any concerns about the safety of SRK Dam, it
should not be construed as being specific to SRK Dam. Applying these analyses to SRK
Dam, or any other dam would require a laboratory and field investigation of geometry
and material properties of that specific dam. Lacking these investigations, this research
should be viewed a general evaluation of the failure mode, and the development of
procedures to evaluate the failure mode.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Dams and reservoirs play a vital role in providing usable water for humanity.
They regulate flooding, can be used for recreation, and produce clean hydroelectric
power. A dam is a manmade structure that needs to be designed, built, and maintained
thoroughly as the failure of a dam can cause major loss of life and property damage.
One phenomenon that can threaten the stability of a dam is rapid drawdown.
This occurs when the water level on the upstream face of a dam decreases at such a
rate that the dam’s fine-grained materials do not have enough time to drain and adjust.
Without the buttressing effect of the water, the upstream slope becomes less stable.
Rapid drawdown may lead to slope failure, which may develop into dam breach.
Another threat to a dam’s stability is earthquake shakings. Earthquakes can
cause such damage to a dam as cracks, crest settlement, and slope failure. They can lead
to overtopping or internal erosion that develops into a dam breach. Earthquakes may
cause seiches and large waves in the reservoir that may overtop the dam. Damage to a
water-releasing structure such as a spillway, river outlet, or penstock can impede
controlled water release and may lead to overtopping.
An aftershock is a smaller earthquake that follows the larger main shock. An
aftershock that follows a large earthquake can be quite large itself and may cause more
damage to the already weakened structures. If a reservoir were to being drawn down
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after exhibiting damage from a main shock, it is very likely that it would also experience
aftershocks.
Rapid drawdown and aftershocks may seem unrelated. However, under certain
circumstances, they may contribute to a dam breach. One possible sequence starts when
a large earthquake occurs and causes consequential damage to a fine-grained
embankment dam. The dam operators, in an attempt to lessen the load on the dam, may
decide to draw down the reservoir. As a result, the upstream slope will be in a rapiddrawdown condition. An aftershock may occur within that time period and may cause
slope failure, which in turn may lead to dam breach. This sequence is shown in Fig 1.1.

Fig. 1.1 Simplified event tree for possible dam breach event due to rapid drawdown and
aftershock loading.
This research investigates the failure mode of rapid drawdown with earthquake
aftershocks, leading to a dam breach. The Dam used in the analyses is Sirikit Dam (SRK
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Dam). SRK Dam is a 113.6 m tall earth dam located in Uttaradit Province, Thailand. Its
large reservoir and powerhouse have a vital role in providing fresh water, preventing
flooding, and generating electricity for the northern region of Thailand. There are two
known active faults located within a 200 km radius of the dam.
SRK Dam has a very large reservoir and thus cannot be drawn down very rapidly.
It is also in a region with moderate seismicity. To make this research applicable to other
dams, the analyses include larger drawdown rates and larger earthquake aftershocks
than SRK Dam could experience.
The objectives of this research are as follows:
•

To identify if this new mode of failure should be included in risk assessment
for embankment dams.

•

To analyze the stability of SRK Dam in the event of rapid drawdown coupled
with aftershock loading.

•

To determine whether to modify the current large earthquake emergency
plan.

To perform this research, SRK Dam is modeled in GeoStudio 2020. The initial
water level is at normal full pool for the reservoir (+162m MSL). The embankment
material properties are determined from existing data, literature, and engineering
judgment. The two analyses in GeoStudio are SEEP/W and SLOPE/W. SEEP/W analyzes
the steady-state seepage conditions for a water level from +162m MSL to +112m MSL at
5m intervals. The levels of drawdown in meters are 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45,
and 50. These levels include the practical and impractical drawdown for SRK Dam.
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SLOPE/W uses the pore water pressure condition from SEEP/W analyses and various
seismic coefficients to determine the critical factor of safety for each scenario. From
then on, scenarios with practical drawdown levels and aftershock seismic coefficients
are analyzed to determine if the factors of safety meet the minimum requirement.
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 is the research introduction of the
subject and objectives. Chapter 2 presents a summary of literature materials relevant to
understanding and selecting suitable data and parameters in soil strengths, rapid
drawdown analysis, seismic hazard analysis, and aftershocks. Chapter 3 is a description
of data used in the analysis of SRK Dam in case of rapid drawdown and aftershock
loading. Chapter 4 describes the development of SRK Dam model in the GeoStudio
program. Chapter 5 discusses the analysis procedure and presents the results. Lastly,
Chapter 6 contains the summary and conclusions of this research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
Although there is extensive research on the topic of rapid drawdown and seismic
loading on dams, there is little research that include the two events happening
simultaneously. The effects both phenomena have on slope stability are still little
known.
The following topics are related to strength parameters for an existing dam,
rapid drawdown, ground motion prediction, and aftershocks.

2.2 Fully Softened Shear Strength

2.2.1 Stress-Strain Behavior in Fine-Grained Soils
Overconsolidated and compacted clays have brittle stress-strain characteristics.
After the peak in the stress-strain curve has been reached, the shearing resistance of the
brittle soils decrease with further strain. Skempton (1977) concluded that
overconsolidated clays undergo a softening process which results in the fully softened
strength and not the peak shear strength of the intact or unsoftened overconsolidated
clay. Fully softened strengths are used for slopes that have not undergone previous
sliding (first-time slides).
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The source of the fully softened strength of fine-grained soil is achieved when
clay structure is destroyed during straining. With further strain, clay particles align with
the failure surface forming slickensides, and strength is further reduced to a residual
shear strength. Both fully softened and residual shear strength depend on mineral
composition, which is related to plasticity and grain-size characteristics.
Fully softened strength is numerically equivalent to the drained peak strength of
a normally consolidated specimen given that there is no preexisting slickensided failure
surface as shown in Fig. 2.1. It corresponds with the back-calculated strengths of firsttime slides. Once a failure has occurred and a continuous slickensided failure surface has
developed, only the residual shear strength is available to resist sliding.
This type of stress-strain behavior makes progressive failure possible, and makes
it impossible to mobilize the peak strength simultaneously at all points around a
potential shear surface.

Shear Stress

Peak overconsolidated

Peak normally consolidated
Fully softened

Displacement
Fig. 2.1 Shear strengths of fine-grained soil.
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2.2.2 Progressive Failure
Duncan, Wright, and Brandon (2014)
Progressive failure is an effect of soil brittleness. Field observations indicate that
the fully softened strength can be mobilized around excavations in fissured clays and
compacted clay embankments subjected to cycles of desiccation and weathering.
A non-uniform ratio of stress to strength along the potential slip surface results
in different points reaching the peak strength and fully softened strength at different
times. Duncan et al. (2014) stated that in the case of excavated slopes in
overconsolidated clay and shales, particularly stiff-fissured clays and shales, there is a
strong possibility of progressive failure. Immediately after excavation of the slope (at
time t1), only the stresses at point A might have reached the peak of the stressdisplacement curve as shown in Fig. 2.2. The slope would rebound into the cut as a
result of delayed response to the unloading from the excavation, and possibly also due
to swelling of the clay as its water content increases following the reduction in stress.
With time (t2), the displacements at A, B, and C would all be larger. The shear
stress at point A would decrease as it moves beyond the peak, and the shear stresses at
points B and C would move toward the peak.
At some later time (t3), the shear stress at point B would also pass the peak and
decrease the average shear strength. Through this process, progressively, failure would
spread around the slip surface, without ever mobilizing the peak shear strength
simultaneously at all points along the slip surface.
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In conclusion, it would be an overestimation to assume that the entire slope is at
peak strength when mobilized. Therefore, in slope stability analysis where slickensides
have not developed, fully softened strength is used to model progressive failure.

Fig 2.2. Mechanism of progressive failure on an excavated slope in overconsolidated
clay (Duncan et al. 2014).
2.2.3 Drained Fully Softened Friction Angle for Fine-Grained Soil
Stark and Hussain (2013)
The fully softened strength of fine-grained soil corresponds to a random
arrangement of clay particles and is stress dependent. Therefore, an empirical
correlation incorporating effective normal stress (σ’n), liquid limit (LL), and clay fraction
(CF) provides a good estimate of the friction angles. These empirical correlations were
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developed using torsional ring shear test results and verified using back-analysis of
landslide case histories.
Stark and Hussain (2013) stated that the empirical correlation for drained fully
softened secant friction angle requires only LL and CF to estimate the drained ɸ’fs.
Thus, the fully softened strength correlation suggested by Stark, Choi, and McCone
(2005) provides a reliable estimate of ɸ’fs for use in preliminary design, verification of
laboratory test results, and confirmation of back analysis of first-time slides.
The fully softened strength empirical correlation uses three different CF groups
(CF ≤ 20%, 25% ≤ CF ≤ 45%, and CF ≤ 50%) and accounts for the effect of CF and σ’n on
ɸ’fs values, as shown in Fig. 2.3.

Fig 2.3 Empirical correlation for drained fully softened secant friction angle based on LL,
CF, and σ’n for 39 natural soils (Stark and Hussain 2013).
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The current study suggests a separate mathematical expression for each trend
line of the correlation in Fig. 2.3 that can be used to estimate values of ɸ’fs and a stressdependent strength envelope using values of LL and CF measured using disaggregated
samples.

2.2.4 Effective Cohesion
The fully softened shear strength corresponds to the drained peak strength of a
normally consolidated specimen, and this suggests that the value of effective stress
cohesion (c’) should be set to zero, i.e., the value of cohesion measured in shear tests on
normally consolidated clay (Holtz et al. 2013; Terzaghi et al. 1996) for the analysis of
first-time slides in overconsolidated clays. This is important because even small values of
c’ can result in significant differences in calculated factors of safety, especially in shallow
slides, such as levee or embankment slopes. However, back-analysis of first-time slides
in London clay indicates that small values of c’, approximately 0.96 kPa (20 psf), can be
mobilized (Chandler and Skempton 1974). Skempton (1977) also suggested a c’ of 0.96
kPa (20 psf) and a ɸ’fs of 20 degrees for London clay. Mesri and Abdel-Ghaffar (1993)
back-analyzed 45 case histories and concluded that c’ can range from zero to 24 kPa. In
summary, the fully softened value of cohesion should be zero unless back-analysis of
local case histories suggests a value greater than zero.
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2.3 Slope Stability During Rapid Drawdown
The upstream slope stability of an embankment dam or a levee is influenced by
water pressure. The water has a buttressing effect that increases the stability of the
upstream slope. If the water level drops at such a rapid rate that the pore pressures
within the slope do not have enough time to adjust in equilibrium with the drop in
external water level, the slope becomes less stable (Duncan et al. 1990). Rapid
drawdown failure can and does happen on river bank slopes and other slopes subject to
submersion.
Rapid drawdown is frequently the design condition that controls the steepness of
the upstream slopes of dams. Factors of safety for this condition vary from case to case.
For dams with an extremely large storage capacity, rapid drawdown from a high reservoir
level is an improbable event. Therefore, the factor of safety for the rapid drawdown
condition may be lower. On the other hand, pumped-storage reservoirs experience
drastic water level changes as a regular operating condition. Therefore, they require a
higher factor of safety for the drawdown condition. The minimum required factor of
safety for rapid drawdown from USACE Slope Stability manual (2003a) is 1.1–1.3.
The permeability of the embankment material dictates the rate at which an
embankment will drain. The higher the permeability, the faster the material drains. In
some cases, it may be difficult to decisively determine if the material will drain or not.
Thus, it must be assumed that drainage will or will not occur, whichever will result in the
lower shear strength within the particular zone, and the lowest factor of safety for the
slope (Duncan et al. 1990).
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There are a number of methods for analyzing slope stability during rapid
drawdown. These include the effective stress method, the Corps of Engineers method
(U.S. Army 2003), and the Lowe and Karafiath method. In 1990, Duncan, Wright, and
Wong proposed the “multi-stage rapid drawdown analysis,” also known as “staged
undrained strength,” that combines the best features of previous methods. The three
steps are as follows:
1. Determine whether drainage will occur during rapid drawdown. This must be
performed for every soil layer in the cross-section. The dimensionless time factor
T is estimated by the following equation:
T = cv t/D2

(Eq. 2.1)

where cv = coefficient of consolidation, t = time for drawdown, and D (or H) =
length of drainage path.
Values of cv can be calculated using data for the time rate of
consolidation during consolidation tests. Approximate values for various types of
compacted soils are listed in table 2.1.
If the calculated value of T is equal to or greater than 0.848, the
dissipation of excess pore pressures during drawdown will be 90 percent or
more, and it is reasonable to consider the material fully drained. If the value of T
is less than 0.848, undrained strength should be considered. The following steps
assure that the undrained strength used in the stability analyses will not be
larger than the drained strength. If there is doubt whether or not complete
drainage will occur, the material should be assumed to be undrained.
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2. Establish the strength envelopes required for the analyses. If the materials drain
during drawdown, only the drained strength envelope is required. If lowpermeability materials are undrained during drawdown, both the drained
envelope and the undrained envelope from an isotopically consolidated CU test
are required. The required envelopes for values of Kc between 1.0 and Kf can be
determined by linear interpolation.
Kc is the effective principal stress ratio during consolidation, σ’1c/ σ’3c. In the
earlier rapid drawdown method presented by Lowe and Karafiath in 1960, the
undrained stress of soils, when plotted as τff vs σ’fc , varies with Kc. The value of
this ratio can vary from unity (for consolidation under isotropic stresses) to Kf,
the value σ’1c/ σ’3c at failure. For any material there is a family of undrained
strength envelopes corresponding to different values of Kc varying from 1.0 to Kf.
This multistage analysis uses this τff vs. σ’fc envelope as shown in Fig. 2.4.

Table 2.1 Approximate value of cv for various soils (after Duncan et al.,1990).
Type of Soil
Values of cv
ft2/day
m2/day
Coarse sand
>10,000
> 929
Fine sand
100 to 10,000
9.3 to 929
Silty sand
10 to 1000
0.93 to 92.9
Silt
0.5 to 100
4.6x 10-2 to 9.3
Compacted clay
0.05 to 5
4.6 x 10-3 to 0.46
Soft clay
< 0.2
< 1.86 x 10-2

3. Calculate the factor of safety after drawdown for a slip surface using a 3-step
procedure:
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Fig. 2.4 Undrained strength envelope (Duncan et al. 1990).
i.

Perform a stability analysis before drawdown using drained strength
parameters for all materials in the slope. The pore-water pressure
condition uses the piezometric line before drawdown. This step is to
determine the effective normal stress (σ’fc) and shear stress (τff) on the
base of each slice and the value of Kc for each slice.

ii.

Perform an analysis of stability after drawdown using piezometric line
after drawdown as pore-water pressure condition. For materials that
drain during drawdown, use effective strength parameters. For materials
that do not drain freely, use the interpolated strengths determined in
stage i.

iii.

Compute drained strength for all slices along the slip surface using the
effective normal stress from stage ii and the effective strength
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parameters. For materials that do not drain freely, compute the
undrained strength at the base of the slice and compare with the drained
strength. Choose the smaller strength to compute factor of safety.
4. Repeat the 3-step procedure for other slip surfaces to locate the critical slip
surface (the one with the lowest factor of safety) following drawdown.

2.4 Ground Motion Prediction
The Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center (PEER), in collaboration with
international multidisciplinary experts, has developed the “Next Generation of GroundMotion Attenuation Models” (NGA, also known as NGA-West1) project. The main
objective is to develop ground-motion prediction relations for shallow crustal
earthquakes in the western United States and similar active tectonic regions. Five teams
of experts developed the ground motion prediction equations (GMPEs) to be used in
earthquake hazard analysis at the global and regional levels (Power 2019). The
developer teams are as follows:
•

Abrahamson, Silva, and Kamai (ASK)

•

Boore, Stewart, Seyhan, and Atkinson (BSSA)

•

Campbell and Bozorgnia (CB)

•

Chiou and Youngs (CY)

•

Idriss (I)

These teams worked independently on their models but had frequent interactions.
NGA-West2 is the follow-up project which is the current version.
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Ground Motion Prediction Equations (GMPEs), or “attenuation” relationships,
provide a means of predicting the level of ground shaking and its associated uncertainty
at any given site or location, based on an earthquake magnitude, source-to-site
distance, local soil conditions, fault mechanism, etc. GMPEs are efficiently used to
estimate ground motions for use in both deterministic and probabilistic seismic hazard
analyses.
Bozorgnia et al., 2014
The NGA-West2 database includes 21,332 (mostly) three-component recordings,
after excluding the recordings with missing important metadata (like magnitude) and/or
missing ground motion data (like PGA). The database includes a moment magnitude
range of 3.0 to 7.9. The range of distances from the recording site to the rupture plane is
from 0.05 to 1533 km. However, the database is well populated up to around the
400 km range.
The horizontal GMPEs address: horizontal components of peak ground
acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), and pseudo-absolute response spectral
acceleration (PSA) for at least 21 oscillator periods (T) ranging from 0.01 to 10 s. The
general applicable limits of the NGA-West2 GMPEs are: M ≤ 8.5 for strikeslip faults,
M ≤ 8.0 for reverse faults, and M ≤ 7.5 for normal faults; and rupture distance, RRUP, or
Joyner and Boore distance, RJB, ranging from 0 to 300 km.
The NGA-West1 and NGA-West2 spectral acceleration ground motion models
were developed for a reference damping ratio of 5%. As part of the NGA-West2 project,
PEER researchers developed a new damping model that can be used to adjust the 5%
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damped GMPEs for damping values ranging from 0.5% to 30%. The new damping model
was developed directly from the NGA-West2 database and is independent of any
specific GMPE.
NGA-West2 GMPEs include terms for local site amplification, and all five NGAWest2 GMPEs use the average shear-wave velocity in the upper 30 m of sediments, VS30,
as the site parameter.
Additionally, there are a number of supporting research projects assisting in
defining and constraining the GMPEs. The NGA database and models are updated and
adjust when new data is available.
Models of the NGA research programs are adopted by the earthquake
community in a wide spectrum of application such as: (1) site-specific seismic analysis
and design of structures and facilities; (2) development of regional seismic hazard maps
for use in building codes, financial estimation, etc.; and (3) social and financial loss
estimation.

2.5 Deterministic Seismic Hazard Analysis
Kramer (1996)
Deterministic seismic hazard analysis (DSHA) is a four-step seismic hazard
evaluation at a particular site. The steps can be simply described as follows:
1. Identify all earthquake sources capable of producing significant ground
motion at the site. Characterize their geometry and earthquake potential.
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2. Select a distance parameter from source to site for each source zone.
Typically, the shortest distance is selected. It can be the distance from the
earthquake epicenter or hypocenter.
3. Select the earthquake expected to produce the largest level of shaking at the
site (the controlling earthquake). The selection is made by comparing the
levels of shaking caused by the earthquake potential from step 1 occurring at
the distance of step 2.
4. Define the hazard at the site, normally in terms of the ground motion
parameters of the controlling earthquake. Peak acceleration, peak velocity,
and response spectrum ordinates are commonly used to characterize the
seismic hazard.
This procedure does not provide information on the likelihood of occurrence.
DSHA is a worst-case-scenario evaluation. However, it is still a suitable hazard analysis
for critical structure such as large dams which may cause disastrous consequences upon
failure.

2.6 Aftershock Magnitude
Båth, 1965
Båth’s law states that for shallow shocks, there is a finite difference between the
magnitude of the earthquake main shock (M) and the largest aftershock (M1). The
difference is 1.2 and it is independent of magnitude. Båth’s law can be expressed as
follows:
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(Eq. 2.2)

M – M1 = 1.2

The magnitudes are based on the surface wave scale. Equation 2.2 implies that the
seismic energy of the main shock is on average about 53 times as large as the energy of
the largest aftershock. Båth stated that there are exceptions to this law but it still has a
remarkable range of validity nonetheless.
Båth (1965) presents one example of an aftershock sequence that did not strictly
follow Båth’s law was that of the 8.5 Alaska earthquake in March 28, 1964. There was
no definitive largest aftershock, but there were five shocks within the range of 6.5–6.8
magnitude. Together these five shocks yielded the same energy as one shock of
magnitude 7.2 would do. If this is taken to be the largest aftershock (M1), 8.5 – 7.2 = 1.3,
in close agreement with Båth’s law. Assuming that similar circumstances hold in the
case of several equally large main shocks, Båth presented the energy–magnitude
relation as follows:
M − M1 = 1.2 +

N
log� 1 �
N

1.2

(Eq. 2.3)

where N = number of equally large main shocks, N1 = number of largest aftershocks,
and the logarithm is to base 10.
Båth also suggested that the depth of focal depth can affect the largest
aftershock magnitude. The difference between the main shock and the largest
aftershock increases with increasing focal point which can be express as follows:
M − M1 =

2
3

h+1

(Eq. 2.4)

Where h = focal depth in units of 100 km. However, Båth stated that little data existed
from deeper aftershock sequences to test and it would need more investigation.
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There have been more studies on the variability of the difference between the
main shock and the largest aftershock, as well as earthquakes and aftershocks data that
show differences slightly less than 1.2. Shcherbakov and Turcotte (2005) proposed a
modified version of Båth’s law based on an extrapolation of the Gutenberg-Richter
statistics. From their study, the scatter in the modified Båth’s law is less than the scatter
in the original Båth’s Law.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA DESCRIPTION

3.1 SRK Dam

3.1.1 SRK Dam General Characteristics
Sirikit Dam or SRK Dam is the largest zoned earth dam in Thailand. It is located in
Tha Pla District, Uttaradit Province. SRK Dam was constructed as a part of the
Development of the Nan River Basin Project to prevent flooding in the southern area of
Uttaradit Province. Previously known as the Phasom Dam, SRK Dam was buit by the
Royal Irrigation Department. Construction started in 1963 and was completed in 1972,
while the construction of Sirikit Hydropower Plant by the Electricity Generating
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) started in 1968 and was completed in 1972.
SRK Dam construction project comprises the main embankment dam and eight
saddle dams. The main dam height is 113.60 m. The crest level is at +169 m above mean
sea level (MSL) without camber. The crest is 810 m in length and 12 m in width. The
maximum width at the base of the dam is 630 m. SRK Dam is an earth dam with an
impervious clay core, filter drain, and riprap covering part of the upstream slope.
On the upstream side, the slope from elevation +60 to +120 m MSL is 1:3 and the
slope from elevation +120 to crest is 1:2.5. On the downstream side, the slope from
elevation +60 to +150 m MSL is 1:2.5 and the slope from elevation +150 to crest is
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1:2.25 as shown in Fig 3.1 from the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) Sirikit Dam Report
(1975).

Fig 3.1 Maximum section of SRK Dam (Royal Irrigation Department 1975).
Eight saddle dams (or dikes) located 20 km northeast of the main dam have a
total length of 5.3 km. The crest is 8 m wide and the dams’ lengths range from 40 to
1,450 m. The crest level is at +168 m MSL except Dike 2 which stands at +169 m MSL.
The heights of the dikes vary from 1 to 30 m. On the upstream side, the slope from
elevation crest to +160 m MSL is 1:2 and the slope below elevation +160 m MSL is 1:3.
Downstream slope is 1:2. Dike 2 is the only one with an irrigation outlet. The typical asbuilt section of saddle dams is shown in Fig. 3.2.
Fig. 3.3 and 3.4 show a plan view of SRK Dam and saddle dams.
The catchment area of the reservoir is 13,130 km2 with a length of 129 km. The
normal retention level is at +162 m MSL. Maximum retention level is at +166 m MSL.
Tailrace water level is at +76 m MSL. Total storage capacity is 9,510 million m3. Dead
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storage capacity is 4,819 million m3. Average annual inflow (for 10 years return period)
is 2,850 million m3. Average annual loss is 342.20 million m3.

Fig. 3.2 Typical as-built section of a saddle dam (Royal Irrigation Department 1975).

Fig. 3.3 Plan view of SRK Dam (Royal Irrigation Department 1975).
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Fig 3.4 Plan view of saddle dams (Royal Irrigation Department 1975).
SRK Dam has three water-releasing structures: river outlet, penstocks (release
through turbines to produce electricity in the power plant), and spillway, with maximum
releasing capacity of 400 cubic meters per second (CMS), 732 CMS, and 3,250 CMS
respectively.

3.1.2 Site Geology

3.1.2.1 Main Dam
Geologically the main dam site consists of metamorphic rocks from the SilurianDevonian Period. The dam’s foundation is mostly made of quartz-mica schist, talcose
schist, and graphitic schist. Originally, the geological profile consisted of an about 1 m
thick residual soil layer followed by a weathered rock layer and a strong fresh rock layer.
The rocks are highly fractured in a mostly even pattern throughout the site.

25

A fault zone consisting of clay and crushed rock was found at station 0+600 m as
shown in Fig. 3.5. There was no evidence to indicate that it was an active fault.

Fig. 3.5 SRK Dam profile (Royal Irrigation Department 1975).
3.1.2.2 Saddle Dams
Geological feature of the saddle dams site consists of phyllite, phyllitic-shale, and
slaty shale. Originally, the geological profile consisted of an about 4 m thick residual soil
layer followed by a weathered rock layer and a strong fresh rock layer. The rocks are
highly fractured, especially at a depth of 2 to 10 m.

3.1.3 Excavation and Foundation Improvement

3.1.3.1 Main Dam
The excavation was down to the top of the sound rock layer. There was a large
amount of good quality river sand and gravel. They were subsequently used as fill on the
downstream side of the dam. Three rows of grout curtains were constructed to prevent
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seepage through the foundation as shown in Fig. 3.1. The foundation rocks on the right
abutment are highly fractured and discontinuous. Furthermore, there was a rock slide
incident that was the result of constructing intake tunnels. Therefore, the slope was
adjusted to 1:2 and rock anchors and shotcrete were installed.
The inactive fault at station 0+600 m was remediated by removing residual soil
and fractured rocks from the fault and filling with dental concrete.

3.1.3.2 Saddle Dams
Only 1 m of the residual soil layer was removed. The designer believed that to be
sufficient because the saddle dams had low height, low water pressure, and low
overburden.

3.1.4 Material Properties

3.1.4.1 Existing Data
Data for material properties are from Stability Analysis of SRK Dam under Seismic
Loading Report by Geotechnical Engineering Research and Development Center,
Department of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Kasetsart University (GERD) in
2012. Table 3.1 shows the designed material properties for SRK main dam.
Table 3.2 shows and compares material properties during construction (1963–
1972) and after the dam has been in operation (2012). The report from the construction
period stated that the properties of the random fill material were substantially
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Table 3.1. Designed SRK Dam material properties (Geotechnical Engineering Research
and Development Center, 2012).
Net
Saturated
Ø
c
Material
USCS
Weight
Weight
2)
(Degree)
(kg/m
(t/m3)
(t/m3)
Core Zone
SC
2.00
2.12
27.0
0.5
Random Fill
GM, GM-GC
2.00
2.12
28.5
0.2
Sand Filter
*
1.80
1.90
33.0
0.0
Rock Fill
*
1.80
1.90
37.0
0.0
Foundation (Earth)
*
1.90
2.00
27.0
0.0
Foundation (Rock)
Quartzitic
2.60
2.00
30.0
0.5
Schist
consistent (Geotechnical Engineering Research and Development Center 2012).
Therefore, the random fill and the core will be treated as the same material in this
research (clayey sand) but with different levels of compaction and permeability.
There are inconsistency and uncertainty in the recorded data. Therefore, the
material properties used in the analysis will be estimated from a combination of existing
data, typical properties of materials, and engineering judgment.

3.1.4.2 Hydraulic Conductivity (k)
Hydraulic conductivity or permeability of soil represents how quickly water
passes through soil. The value can vary greatly depending on types of soil, void ratio,
turbulence of flow, fines content, clay types, soil density, and compaction.
The value of hydraulic conductivity can be determined in laboratory tests. Table
3.3 provides the general range for the values of hydraulic conductivity (k) for various
soils.
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Table 3.2. Main Dam material properties during construction and after use (after
Geotechnical Engineering Research and Development Center 2012).
During Construction
After use
(RID, 1975)
Property
Unit
(GERD, 2012)
Clay Core
Random Fill
USCS
SC
GM
SC, CL
Liquid Limit
%
31.5
30.1
30.81 – 39.55
Plastic Limit
%
22.04 – 26.58
Plastic Index
%
12.9
7.8
7.41 - 16.86
3
Maximum Dry Density
(t/m )
1.73
2.01
1.31 – 1.90
Optimum Moisture Content
%
14.7
8.7
15.25 - 18.62
Compaction Dry Density
%
99.1
98.9
Compaction Moisture
1.0 dry of
0.9 dry of
%
Content
optimum
optimum
6.5x10-8 Hydraulic Conductivity (k)
cm/s
4x10-8
5.7x10-10
Cc
0.078 - 0.260
2
Effective Cohesion (c’)
kN/m
14.87 - 25.66
Effective Friction Angle (Ø’)
degree
24.74 - 35.52
2
Total Cohesion (c)
kN/m
0.5 (design)
11.26 - 12.92
Total Friction Angle (Ø)
degree
27 (design)
12.92 - 16.34
The impervious sections of earth dam have a k range of 10-6–10-11 m/s (Holtz et
al. 2013). There is no reliable present data for the k value of SRK dam. Combining the
available information with typical values and standards, k values of SRK Dam core and
fill estimated at 4x10-7 m/s and 1.6x10-6 respectively. The significance of the two values
is that the core has one-fourth the permeability of the fill. The estimated k for sand filter
drain is 5x10-4 m/s. For rock riprap, the k value is 0.01 m/s. The exact values of the
hydraulic conductivity of these materials are not as important as the ratios among them.
These estimated values produce a reasonable pore water condition in the dam model
which is vital for analyzing slope stability.
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Table 3.3. Range of the hydraulic conductivity for various soil (after Das and Sivakugan
2019).
Type of Soil
Hydraulic Conductivity, k (m/s)
Medium to coarse gravel
Greater than 10-3
Coarse to fine sand
10-3–10-5
Fine sand, silty sand
10-5–10-7
Silt, clayey silt, silty clay
10-6–10-8
Clays
10-9 or less
The embankment dam is deposited in layers, which results in the difference
between horizontal and vertical permeability. This produces standard anisotropy ratios
(kH/kV) in the embankment as shown in table 3.4.

Table 3.4. Anisotropy of embankment materials according to USBR standard placement
(after U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation 2014).
Material
kH/kV range
Embankment core
4 to 9
Embankment shell
4 to 9
Embankment drains
1 to 4
From the construction report and the downstream piezometers data, it is
reasonable to assume that the kH/kV ratio of SRK core is 4. There was no report on the
effectiveness of compaction of the fill. In order to be on the safe side, a kH/kV ratio of the
shell in this research is 10 to account for the higher level of soil variation. For the sand
drain, rockfill, and riprap layers, the kH/kV ratio is 1 (U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau
of Reclamation 2014).
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3.1.4.3 Cohesions and Friction Angles
More than 45% of rockfill material is 0.03–0.4 m sized rocks with less than 5%
fine material (Geotechnical Engineering Research and Development Center 2012). The
typical effective friction angle for cohesionless rockfill is 45°. Rockfill embankment is an
easily drained material and therefore will go through the cycle of saturation–
unsaturation frequently. When most of the water drains, the moisture film surrounding
the individual grains of material creates an “apparent cohesion.” This phenomenon is
caused by the water surface tension occurring between the surfaces of water, mineral
grains, and air (Holtz et al. 2013). This apparent cohesion should not be relied on for
strengths of the materials as it can vanish when more water is introduced (e.g., rain,
flood) or water evaporates.
As mentioned in section 3.1.4.1, the core and fill layers of the dam were built
with the same material. The typical cohesion of clayey sand and saturated compacted
clayey sand are 5 kPa and 11 kPa respectively (Geotechdata n.d.). This research selected
7.5 kPa as the appropriate effective cohesion value for core and fill material.
In order to determine the drained fully softened friction angle, values of clay size
fraction and liquid limit of the material are required. From the available grain size
analysis data (table 3.5), the core material has an average clay size fraction of 22%. From
Atterberg’s limit data (table 3.6), the core material has an average liquid limit of 35.5%.
Therefore, a reasonable estimation of the drained fully softened friction angle is
32° as shown in Fig. 3.6. The undrained friction angle is estimated to be 17°.
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Table 3.5. Grain size analysis of SRK Dam core sample (Geotechnical Engineering
Research and Development Center 2012).

Table 3.6. Atterberg’s limit of SRK Dam core sample (Geotechnical Engineering Research
and Development Center 2012).

There are no data on the cohesions and friction angles of the sand drain layer
therefore they are assumed to be the same as fill to be on the conservative side.

3.1.4.4 Unit Weights
From the GERD 2012 report, the unit weight (ɣ) of the core zone is 20 kN/m2.
The same unit weight will be used for the fill and drain layer. The rock riprap unit weight
is 22 kN/m2.
The material properties used in this research are shown in table 3.7.
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Fig. 3.6 Drained fully softened friction angle for SRK Dam’s clayey sand material (after
Stark and Hussain 2013).
Table 3.7. Material properties of SRK Dam used in this research.
Material
K (m/s)
kH/kV
c'
ɸ’
c
Zone
Riprap,
0.01
1
0
45
0
Rockfill
Fill
1.6x10-6
10
7.5
32
35
-7
Core
4.0x10
4
7.5
32
35
-4
Drain
5.0x10
1
7.5
32
35

ɸ
45

ɣ
(kN/m2)
22

17
17
17

20
20
20
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3.2 Rapid Drawdown

3.2.1 Drawdown Plot
The maximum rate of drawdown is calculated by the maximum capacity of all
water-releasing structures at SRK Dam (i.e., spillway, power plant turbines, and river
outlet) along with the lowest rate of inflow.
The spillway or service spillway is a two-tunnel horseshoe-section concrete
spillway. The tunnels are 90 m long and each has a diameter of 11 m. The crest elevation
is at +150.5 m MSL. There are 2 radial control gates of the dimensions 11.85 x 15 m. The
maximum water-releasing capacity is 3,250 CMS with the maximum gate opening of
9.2 m.
SRK power plant has 4 generators capable of generating 125 MW each. The
maximum flow through these generator turbines is 732 CMS. The intake sill sits at
+104 m MSL.
The river outlet is a 6 m diameter tunnel. The inlet level is at +104 m MSL. The
river outlet has maximum capacity of 400 CMS.
To estimate the quickest possible drawdown, this analysis will use the reservoir
inflow during dry season. From the recorded average of inflow during the three driest
months of the year, the inflow is estimated to be 30 CMS (Civil Maintenance Division
2003).
From SRK Dam Spillway Manual, the reservoir water level (RWL) can be plotted
against the reservoir storage volume in million cubic meters (MCM) as shown in Fig. 3.7.
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Fig. 3.7 Reservoir water level vs. reservoir volume.
The rate of maximum outflow is calculated by subtracting the minimum inflow
from the combined maximum capacity of all releasing structures. Fig. 3.8 shows the rate
of outflow at each RWL in the range of +162 m MSL to +120 m MSL. Fig. 3.9 shows the
decrease of RWL as the result of the continuous maximum outflow rate.

Fig. 3.8 Reservoir water level vs. maximum outflow rate.
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Fig. 3.9 Reservoir water level vs. time.
This graph represents the quickest possible time that the reservoir can be drawn
down. It is important to note that in practice, there are a number of factors that will
prevent this drastic scenario such as the safety of the downstream community, possible
damage to downstream lands and properties, the higher rate of inflow, and the
stoppage of turbine flow due to a high tailrace water level.

3.2.2 Drawdown Time for SRK Dam
The equation for drawdown time (equation 2.1 in section 2.3) can be used to
calculate the number of days that SRK dam materials will drain after drawdown.
t = TD2/cv

(Eq. 3.1)

The average degree of consolidation, U, as a percentage can express the degree of pore
water pressure dissipation. In the multistage rapid drawdown analysis method by
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Duncan, Wright, and Wong (1990), it is stated that for material to be considered
drained, 90% of excess pore pressure needs to be dissipated. This value is considered
highly conservative since this method considered the material fully undrained up until
that point. In reality, some drainage would have occurred before the dissipation reached
90%. In this research, setting the value of U at 50% is considered to be appropriate to
calculate drawdown time. This is still somewhat conservative for this analysis since
there is a layer of rockfill riprap which is an easily drained material. The time factor, T,
for U = 50% is 0.197 and for U = 90% is 0.848 (Das and Sivakugan 2019).
Length of drainage path, D, is considered in two cases. Given the geometry of the
dam, failure on the upstream face may occur in two modes. First, the slip surfaces may
be controlled by both a decrease in water level and the +120 m MSL berm and result in
relatively shallow failures as shown in Fig. 3.10. In this case, the average depth from the
base of the slice to the surface is approximately 10 m. Secondly, the failure surface may
extend beyond the berm and include the whole face of the upstream slope as shown in
Fig. 3.11. In this case the average estimated drainage depth is 30 m, which is deeper
than the first case.
The range coefficient of consolidation, cv, is estimated from the typical value for
clayey sand because of the limited existing data. This research uses a cv of 1–5 m2/day.
Table 3.8 shows the result of equation 3.1 using the T, D, and cv values selected.

3.2.3 Drawdown History
A maximum drawdown event at SRK Dam occurred in January to March of 1983. The
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Fig. 3.10 An example of a shallow failure surface in the upstream slope of SRK Dam.

Fig. 3.11 An example of a deep failure surface in the upstream slope of SRK Dam.
Table 3.8. Time for drawdown of SRK Dam.
Length of drainage path
U = 50 %
cv (m2/day)
5
1
Shallow (m)
10
4 days
20 days
Deep (m)
30
35 days
177 days

U = 90%
cv (m2/day)

5
17 days
153 days

1
85 days
763 days

water level decreased from +163 m MSL to +143 m MSL in approximately 60 days. This
level of drawdown has happened only once since SRK Dam has been in operation.
Therefore, it is reasonable to state that in the practice, maximum drawdown of SRK
Dam reservoir is 20 m.
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3.3 Seismicity

3.3.1 Earthquake Sources Identification and Characterization

3.3.1.1 Active Faults in The Area
The two active fault zones nearest SRK Dam are the Uttaradit Fault and the
Thoen Fault, as shown in Fig. 3.12. Both faults orientate along a northeast–southwest
direction. The Uttaradit Fault is the closer of the two. The distance from the main dam
to the Uttaradit Fault is in the range of 8 to 62 km. The minimum distance from SRK
main dam to the Thoen Fault is 52 km.

SRK Main Dam

Fig. 3.12 Faults near SRK main dam and saddle dams.
The Earthquake Observation Division, Thai Meteorological Department (n.d.) has
records of earthquake events from the two faults since 2007. The magnitude ranges
from 1.3 to 3.5 with a depth between 1 and 10 km.
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USGS (Petersen et al. 2007) reported the Uttaradit Fault to be a normal fault
with a length of 38 km and the Thoen Fault to be a normal fault with a length of 107 km.
The moment magnitude of each fault can be estimated using the empirical relationship
for normal fault movement presented by Wells and Coppersmith (1994) as follows:
Mw = 4.86 + 1.32 log L

(Eq. 3.2)

Where Mw is the moment magnitude Mw and L is surface rupture length in km.
From equation 3.2, the largest earthquake magnitude of the Uttaradit Fault and
Thoen Fault are 6.95 and 7.55 respectively.

3.3.1.2 Background Earthquake
In addition to the two known faults, there is a possibility of an undiscovered
earthquake source. In a tropical area like Thailand, the precipitation and vegetation
often hinder a thorough exploration and discovery of earthquake faults. Therefore,
another potential earthquake source should be considered. A background earthquake is
an earthquake not linked to identified sources. The maximum background earthquake
(MBE) typically has a magnitude of 6. Because of the uncertainties of the area source,
the source-to-site distance for the background earthquake in this case is 0 km.
The characteristics of the Uttaradit Fault, Thoen Fault, and background
earthquake are presented in table 3.9. The fault mechanism of the two known faults are
summarized from the USGS documentation (Petersen et al. 2007) as well as data from
Thailand’s Department of Mineral Resources (2016).
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Table 3.9. Characteristics of earthquake sources of SRK Dam site.
Source
Mw
Distance (km)
Fault mechanism
Background
6
0
normal hanging
Thoen Fault
7.55
52
normal
foot
Uttaradit Fault
6.95
8
normal hanging

Dip
50
50
50

3.3.2 Peak Ground Acceleration and Horizontal Seismic Coefficient
The maximum peak ground acceleration (PGA) can be estimated from the NGAWest2 Ground Motion Prediction Equations (GMPEs) as mentioned in chapter 2. The
GMPEs spreadsheet is available from the PEER Center (n.d.) website. The input variables
for a maximum earthquake event from a background earthquake, the Thoen Fault, and
the Uttaradit Fault are as shown in table 3.10.

Table 3.10. NGA-West2 GMPEs input variables for a maximum earthquake event from
the three SRK Dam earthquake sources.
Variable

Description

Background

Thoen fault

Mw
RJB (km)
RX (km)

Moment magnitude
Source to site distance
Horizontal distance from top
of rupture measure
perpendicular to fault strike
The average shear-wave
velocity
Unspecified-mechanism factor
Reverse-faulting factor
Normal-faulting factor
Hanging-wall factor
Average dip of rupture plane

6
0
0

7.55
52
-52*

Uttaradit
fault
6.95
8
8*

760**

760**

760**

0
0
1
1
50

0
0
1
0
50

0
0
1
1
50

2,5,10
measured
No
California***

2,5,10
measured
No
California***

2,5,10
measured
No
California**
*

VS30
(m/s)
U
FRV
FNM
FHW
Dip
(deg)
ZTOR (km)
Vs30flag
FAS
Region

Depth to top of rupture
1 for measured, 0 for inferred
Aftershock effect
Regions considered in the
models

*For a hanging wall, Rx is equal to RJB. For a foot wall, Rx is equal to negative RJB.
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** Soil site class B: Rock
*** From the available region in the spreadsheet, California is the closest to SRK Dam
area
The depths of 2, 5, and 10 km are considered based on the recorded seismic
events in the area.
Each of five models is applied and the resulting PGA are averaged as presented
in table 3.11.

Table 3.11. Peak ground acceleration of maximum earthquake from each source.
Source
ZTOR
PGA
(km) ASK14 BSSA14
CB14
CY14
I14
Average
Background
2
0.3675 0.3203 0.3778 0.3161 0.3652
0.35
earthquake
5
0.3048 0.3203 0.2992 0.2414 0.2523
0.28
10
0.2218 0.3203 0.1858 0.1762 0.1561
0.21
Thoen fault
2
0.0871 0.0837 0.0729 0.0723 0.0768
0.08
5
0.1024 0.0837 0.0726 0.0800 0.0764
0.08
10
0.1331 0.0837 0.0718 0.0943 0.0752
0.09
Uttaradit fault
2
0.3860 0.2157 0.2857 0.2532 0.3132
0.29
5
0.3873 0.2157 0.2748 0.2575 0.2857
0.28
10
0.3146 0.2157 0.2247 0.2447 0.2262
0.25

The controlling earthquake in this case is the background earthquake. However,
this research is interested in the aftershock. According to Båth’s law, the largest
aftershock is 1.2 magnitude smaller than the main shock. Subtracting 1.2 from the
moment magnitudes from table 3.9 results in the aftershock moment magnitudes that
can be entered in the GMPEs spreadsheet to calculate PGA. The focal depth range of
earthquake events from both faults is 2 – 10 km. From equation 2.4, the magnitude
difference is between 1.01 and 1.07. Furthermore, there are records of aftershocks that
do not strictly follow Båth’s law. Therefore, 1 and 0.8 magnitude differences are also
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considered. PGA values of each aftershock magnitude are as shown in tables 3.12, 3.13,
and 3.14.

Table 3.12. Peak ground acceleration of the largest aftershock according to Båth’s Law
from each source.
-1.2 Magnitude
Ztor
PGA
Difference
(km) ASK14 BSSA14 CB14
CY14
I14
Average
Background
2
0.1728 0.0927 0.1114 0.1240
-*
0.13
earthquake
5
0.1230 0.0927 0.0845 0.0889
-*
0.10
MW = 4.8
10
0.0794 0.0927 0.0479 0.0644
-*
0.07
Thoen
2
0.0323 0.0336 0.0376 0.0261 0.0302
0.03
MW = 6.35
5
0.0379 0.0336 0.0374 0.0291 0.0300
0.03
10
0.0490 0.0336 0.0368 0.0345 0.0295
0.04
Uttaradit
2
0.1591 0.1581 0.1878 0.1344 0.1582
0.16
MW = 5.75
5
0.1628 0.1581 0.1678 0.1346 0.1419
0.15
10
0.1477 0.1581 0.1250 0.1211 0.1075
0.13
* I14 model is applicable for MW ≥ 5.0

Table 3.13. Peak ground acceleration of 1 magnitude difference aftershock from each
source.
-1 Magnitude
Ztor
PGA
Difference
(km) ASK14 BSSA14 CB14
CY14
I14
Average
Background
2
0.2189 0.1292 0.1474 0.1642 0.2398
0.18
earthquake
5
0.1700 0.1292 0.1129 0.1177 0.1574
0.14
MW = 5
10
0.1160 0.1292 0.0651 0.0838 0.0912
0.10
Thoen
2
0.0398 0.0379 0.0440 0.0317 0.0362
0.04
MW = 6.55
5
0.0467 0.0379 0.0438 0.0353 0.0360
0.04
10
0.0605 0.0379 0.0431 0.0417 0.0354
0.04
Uttaradit
2
0.1974 0.1665 0.2077 0.1537 0.1769
0.18
MW = 5.95
5
0.1989 0.1665 0.1901 0.1537 0.1591
0.17
10
0.1698 0.1665 0.1447 0.1387 0.1214
0.15

The controlling aftershock earthquake from tables 3.12 and 3.13 is from the
Uttaradit Fault while the controlling aftershock earthquake from table 3.14 is from the
background earthquake. Marcuson (1981) suggested that the appropriate seismic
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pseudo-static coefficient for dams should correspond to one-third to one-half of the
acceleration, including amplification or deamplification effects. From the PGA of all
controlling earthquakes, horizontal seismic coefficients (kh) can be determined as shown
in table 3.15.

Table 3.14. Peak ground acceleration of 0.8 magnitude difference aftershock from each
source.
-0.8 Magnitude
Ztor
PGA
Difference
(km) ASK14 BSSA14 CB14
CY14
I14
Average
Background
2
0.2391 0.1807 0.1948 0.2034 0.2584
0.22
earthquake
5
0.1888 0.1807 0.1506 0.1463 0.1713
0.17
MW = 5.2
10
0.1323 0.1807 0.0886 0.1028 0.1006
0.12
Thoen
2
0.0490 0.0426 0.0486 0.0381 0.0437
0.04
MW = 6.75
5
0.0576 0.0426 0.0484 0.0423 0.0434
0.05
10
0.0746 0.0426 0.0477 0.0499 0.0426
0.05
Uttaradit
2
0.2444 0.1753 0.2291 0.1734 0.1987
0.20
MW = 6.15
5
0.2427 0.1753 0.2129 0.1737 0.1792
0.20
10
0.1949 0.1753 0.1650 0.1578 0.1377
0.17
Table 3.15. Horizontal seismic coefficients of each controlling aftershock earthquake in
the range of one-third to one-half peak ground acceleration.
Controlling Aftershock PGA
kh
One-third
One-half
0.16
0.05
0.08
0.18
0.06
0.09
0.22
0.07
0.11
To account for the amplification effect, Anderson et al. (2008) recommended the
following equations:
kav = αkmax

where kmax = peak seismic coefficient at the ground surface
α = fill height-dependent reduction factor

(Eq. 3.3)
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For the site class B rock foundation,
α = 1.20*(1+0.01H[(0.5β)-1])

(Eq. 3.4)

If the fill height is greater than 100 feet, H can be assumed to be 100 in
Equation 3.4.
β = 1 second PSa/PGA

(Eq. 3.5)

where 1 second Psa is predicted from GMPEs models.
Kh is suggested to be in the range of 0.5kav to 1.0 kav. Table 3.16 shows the values
of kh when amplification is considered.

Table 3.16. Horizontal seismic coefficients of each controlling aftershock earthquake
with amplification effect.
Controlling
α
Amplification
kh
Aftershock
(GERD, 2012)
0.5
0.75
1.0
PGA
0.16
0.2453
2.67
0.05
0.08
0.10
0.18
0.2807
2.63
0.07
0.10
0.13
0.22
0.1663
2.57
0.05
0.07
0.09
kh values of the Uttaradit controlling aftershock from tables 3.15 and 3.16
generally matched. The background aftershock produces lower 1 second Psa values,
which results in a lower amplification effect on the kh. Considering the existing data and
both methods of estimation, the reasonable range of aftershock kh analyzed in this
research is 0.05 to 0.1.
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CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL
This research uses GeoStudio 2020’s SEEP/W and SLOPE/W to analyze the slope
stability of SRK Dam in case of rapid drawdown and aftershock loading.
SRK Dam’s geometry is plotted onto the program according to the as-built
maximum section drawing of the dam in the 2-D analysis. The crest elevation does not
include camber. Fig. 4.1 shows the 2D geometry of SRK Dam in GeoStudio.

Fig. 4.1 SRK Dam geometry in GeoStudio.
SEEP/W is used to achieve the seepage condition through the dam. The analysis
type is steady-state with the water level at full normal retention level of +162 m MSL.
The materials are defined as presented in table 4.1.
The model mesh is set to a quads and triangles pattern. An element size of 1 m is
used for the element in the area subjected to changes in water level and seepage
condition, such as the upper part of upstream fill and the core. The downstream fill
element is 3x3 and the foundation element is 6x6 as shown in Fig. 4.2.
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Table 4.1. Material definitions in SEEP/W.
Material

Region Color

Core
Upstream fill
Downstream fill
Drain
Riprap
Foundation

Material model
Saturated/Unsaturated
Saturated/Unsaturated
Saturated/Unsaturated
Saturated
Saturated/Unsaturated
Saturated

Saturated kx Anisotropy
(m/s)
Ky’/kx’
-7
4x10
0.25
1.6x10-6
0.1
-6
1.6x10
0.1
-4
5.0x10
1
0.01
1
-10
1x10
1

The boundary condition on the upstream slope is set as 162 m constant water
total head.

.
Fig. 4.2 SRK Dam model mesh.
In SLOPE/W, the analysis type is Spencer with Staged Rapid Drawdown analysis
(Duncan et al. 1990), with settings as shown in Fig. 4.3. This setting only allows
piezometric lines as pore water pressure conditions.
The slip surface setting is as follows. The direction of movement for upstream
analysis is right to left and for downstream analysis is left to right. The slip surface
option is entry and exit. The entry range is set to always include at least some part of

47

Fig. 4.3 Setting in SLOPE/W for rapid drawdown and seismic loading analysis.
the dam crest because such failures will decrease the height of the crest and increase
the risk of dam overtopping. The exit range for the upstream slope analysis is set in two
modes. The two possible failure surfaces, as mentioned in section 3.2.2, are shallow
failures and deep failures. The minimum slip surface depth is set to 7 m.
The 0 point of the X-axis is set at the centerline of the dam crest. The Ycoordinates are the elevation above mean sea level as in SRK Dam as-built drawing.
The initial entry and exit range of the shallow failures on the upstream slope is
set as shown in Fig. 4.4 and 4.5. The next step is solving for the critical slip surface to
estimate the entry and exit points of the failure. The entry and exit ranges are then
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narrowed down and the number of increments is increased to achieve a more precise
and accurate factor of safety for the critical slip surface. This process is repeated until
the safety factor value is within 0.01 of the previous step’s value.

Fig. 4.4 Setting of the initial entry and exit range of shallow failure mode on the
upstream slope.
Initial Entry Range
Initial Exit Range

Fig. 4.5 Range of entry and exit on SRK Dam Model for shallow failure surface on the
upstream slope.

49

The initial entry and exit range of the deep failures on the upstream slope is set
as shown in Fig. 4.6 and 4.7. The initial entry point range is the same used in the shallow
failure analysis. The exit range is set at the upstream toe area so that the failure would
include the majority of the slope and tangent to the foundation. The entry and exit
ranges are narrowed down and the number of increments is increased until the safety
factor value is within 0.01 of the previous step’s value.

Fig. 4.6 Setting of the initial entry and exit range of deep failure surface on the upstream
slope.
The initial entry and exit range of the failures on the downstream slope is set as
shown in Fig. 4.8 and 4.9. The downstream side is not affected by the water level
drawdown, and therefore the exit range is not limited to the shallow or deep failure
surface. The process of narrowing the entry and exit range and increasing the number of
increments is the same used in the upstream analysis.
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Initial Exit Range

Initial Entry Range

Fig. 4.7 Range of initial entry and exit on SRK Dam Model for deep failure surface on the
upstream slope.

Fig. 4.8 Setting of the initial entry and exit range of failure on the downstream slope.
The material properties in SLOPE/W are as presented in table 4.2.
In this research scenario, the horizontal seismic coefficient (kh) of the largest
aftershock is in the range of 0.05 to 0.08 according to Båth’s law. Kh may reach 0.1 if the
aftershock is larger than expected. The value for kh in these research analyses are 0,
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Initial Entry Range

Initial Exit Range

Fig. 4.9 Range of initial entry and exit on SRK Dam Model for failure on the downstream
slope.
Table 4.2 Material definitions in SLOPE/W.

Material
Core
Upstream fill
Downstream
fill
Drain
Riprap

Region
Color

Material model
Mohr-Coulomb
Mohr-Coulomb

Basic
Unit Weight
c’
3
(kN/m )
(kPa)
20
7.5
20
7.5

ɸ’
(°)
32
32

R Envelope*
c
ɸ
(kPa) (°)
35
17
35
17

Mohr-Coulomb

20

7.5

32

35

17

Mohr-Coulomb
Mohr-Coulomb
Bedrock
Foundation
(impenetrable)
* Undrained strength parameters

20
22

7.5
0

32
45

35
5

17
44

-

-

-

-

-

0.025, 0.0375, 0.05, 0.0625, 0.075, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, and 0.30. Larger seismic coefficients
were included to make this research applicable to other dams in more seismically active
regions.
The levels of drawdown in this analysis are from 0 to 50 m with 5-meter, at 5meter interval. The maximum drawdown of SRK Dam is 20 meters. The larger levels are
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included to make this research applicable to other dams with more drastic drawdown
level.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

5.1 Corrections for Upstream Slope Analysis

5.1.1 Pore Water Pressure Condition
One of the limitations of Staged Rapid Drawdown analysis in SLOPE/W is that
only piezometric line can be used as the pore water pressure (PWP) condition. There is
no option to use the result from SEEP/W analysis. The piezometric line is traced as
closely as possible from the result of SEEP/W seepage analysis. The factor of safety (FS)
results from the two PWP conditions are expected to differ. In order to determine the
discrepancy and solve for the correction equations, the following condition is set up to
compare the results in FS: water level is at 162 m and analysis mode is “Staged Pseudostatic analysis: Undrained Strengths (Duncan et al., 1990).”
For the upstream shallow failure mode and deep failure mode, the results are as
shown in tables 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. The ratio is calculated by the FS of the PWP:
SEEP/W result analysis divided by the FS of the PWP: Piezometric line analysis.
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Table 5.1. Factors of safety from the analyses using the result of SEEP/W analysis and
piezometric line as pore water pressure condition (shallow failure surface).
Factor of Safety
Ratio
kh
PWP: SEEP/W Result
PWP: Piezometric Line
0.00
2.08
1.82
1.143
0.025
1.87
1.63
1.143
0.0375
1.77
1.55
1.143
0.05
1.69
1.48
1.143
0.0625
1.62
1.41
1.144
0.075
1.55
1.35
1.143
0.10
1.42
1.24
1.144
0.15
1.23
1.07
1.145
0.20
1.08
0.943
1.146
0.30
0.871
0.757
1.151
Table 5.2. Factors of safety from the analyses using the result of SEEP/W analysis and
piezometric line as pore water pressure condition (deep failure surface).
Factor of Safety
kh
Ratio
PWP: SEEP/W Result
PWP: Piezometric Line
0.00
2.25
1.89
1.188
0.025
1.95
1.64
1.188
0.0375
1.83
1.54
1.188
0.05
1.72
1.45
1.188
0.0625
1.63
1.37
1.189
0.075
1.54
1.30
1.188
0.10
1.39
1.17
1.189
0.15
1.17
0.985
1.189
0.20
1.01
0.849
1.190
0.30
0.792
0.665
1.191

From tables 5.1 and 5.2, it is clear that the factors of safety from the analysis
using the SEEP/W result PWP condition is higher than that from the analysis using the
piezometric line. Furthermore, the ratio from the deep failure surface is higher than the
shallow failure surface. This increase is expected since the amount of seepage in the
deep failure surface is more than the shallow, and therefore the ratio should be greater.

55

The factors of safety from the piezometric line analysis are plotted against the ratios
(Fig. 5.1) and the curve fitted to achieve the correction equations (eq. 5.1 and 5.2).

1.200
1.190

Ratio

1.180
Shallow

1.170

Deep
Shallow Curve Fit

1.160

Deep Curve Fit

1.150
1.140

0.50

0.70

0.90

1.10

1.30

1.50

1.70

1.90

2.10

Factor of Safety

Fig. 5.1 Factor of safety of the piezometric line analysis vs. PWP: SEEP/W result to PWP:
Piezometric Line factor of safety ratio.
Shallow Failure Mode FS Correction =
1.1895 – 0.08617*FS + 0.053536*FS2 – 0.011133*FS3
Deep Failure Mode FS Correction = 1.1922 – 0.0026284*FS

(Eq. 5.1)
(Eq. 5.2)

5.1.2 Initial Condition
The other limitation of Staged Rapid Drawdown analysis in SLOPE/W is that the
horizontal seismic coefficient (kh) is applied in the first stage of the analysis, which does
not represent the initial condition of the scenario. In the “Staged Pseudo-static analysis:
Undrained Strengths (Duncan et al., 1990)” analysis mode, the kh is not applied in the
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first stage and is therefore more accurate. The following analyses were performed to
compare the results in FS between the two analysis modes: water level is at 162 m and
piezometric line is used as PWP.
The results for the upstream shallow failure surface and deep failure surface are
as shown in tables 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. The ratio is calculated by the FS of the
Staged Pseudo-static analysis divided by the FS of the Staged Rapid Drawdown analysis.

Table 5.3. Factors of safety from the staged pseudo-static analysis and staged rapid
drawdown analysis (shallow failure surface).
Factor of Safety
kh
Ratio
Staged Pseudo-static analysis Staged Rapid Drawdown analysis
0.00
1.82
1.84
0.991
0.025
1.63
1.64
0.995
0.0375
1.55
1.56
0.997
0.05
1.48
1.48
0.999
0.0625
1.41
1.41
1.001
0.075
1.35
1.35
1.004
0.10
1.24
1.23
1.008
0.15
1.07
1.05
1.019
0.20
0.943
0.908
1.039
0.30
0.757
0.699
1.083

From tables 5.3 and 5.4, there is a discrepancy in FS between the two modes of
analysis. The maximum difference is 8% for kh = 0.3 in shallow failure mode, followed by
7.5% kh = 0.15 and 0.2 in deep failure mode. In the kh range particularly relevant to this
research (0.05–0.1), the difference does not exceed 5.2%. These ratios will be used as
correction in the next stage of analysis. The kh is plotted against the ratio as shown in Fig
5.2.
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Table 5.4. Factors of safety from the staged pseudo-static analysis and staged rapid
drawdown analysis (deep failure surface).
Factor of Safety
kh
Ratio
Staged Pseudo-static analysis Staged Rapid Drawdown analysis
0.00
1.89
1.91
0.991
0.025
1.64
1.67
0.983
0.0375
1.54
1.57
0.977
0.05
1.45
1.49
0.970
0.0625
1.37
1.42
0.965
0.075
1.30
1.35
0.958
0.10
1.17
1.24
0.947
0.15
0.985
1.07
0.925
0.20
0.849
0.918
0.925
0.30
0.665
0.691
0.962

1.15
1.10

Ratio

1.05
1.00

Shallow
Deep

0.95
0.90
0.85

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25
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Fig. 5.2 kh vs. staged pseudo-static analysis to staged rapid drawdown analysis factor of
safety ratio.
No corrections are required for the downstream failure mode because there is
no significant seepage on the downstream side.
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5.2 Staged Rapid Drawdown Analysis
The levels of drawdown in this analysis are from 0 to 50 m, at 5 m intervals. Each
level is analyzed using the “Staged Rapid Drawdown analysis (Duncan et al., 1990)”
settings with horizontal seismic coefficients of 0, 0.025, 0.0375, 0.05, 0.0625, 0.075,
0.10, 0.15, 0.20, and 0.30. This process is to achieve the critical slip surface and the
factor of safety in each condition for all three modes of slope failure (upstream shallow
failure, upstream deep failure, and downstream failure). The abovementioned
corrections are applied to the factors of safety to attain the most accurate value
possible. Tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 show the results of the analyses. Fig. 5.3 and 5.4 show
the plot of kh vs. factors of safety for shallow failure and deep failure respectively.

Table 5.5. Factors of safety for upstream shallow failure surface in each drawdown level
and horizontal seismic coefficient.
Factors of Safety for Each Drawdown Level (Shallow Failure)
kh
0m
5m 10m 15m 20m 25m 30m 35m 40m 45m 50m
0.00
2.10 1.90 1.71 1.56 1.46 1.37 1.29 1.23 1.19 1.18 1.18
0.025 1.87 1.70 1.56 1.45 1.34 1.26 1.20 1.15 1.11 1.10 1.11
0.0375 1.77 1.63 1.50 1.39 1.30 1.22 1.16 1.12 1.08 1.07 1.08
0.05
1.69 1.56 1.44 1.34 1.25 1.18 1.12 1.09 1.05 1.05 1.05
0.0625 1.61 1.49 1.39 1.30 1.22 1.15 1.09 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.03
0.075 1.55 1.44 1.34 1.25 1.18 1.12 1.06 1.03 1.01 1.00 1.01
0.10
1.42 1.33 1.25 1.17 1.11 1.05 1.01 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96
0.15
1.23 1.16 1.10 1.04 0.99 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87
0.20
1.08 1.03 0.98 0.94 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.79
0.30
0.87 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68
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Table 5.6. Factors of safety for upstream deep failure surface in each drawdown level
and horizontal seismic coefficient.
Factors of Safety for Each Drawdown Level (Deep Failure)
kh
0m
5m 10m 15m 20m 25m 30m 35m 40m 45m 50m
0.00
2.27 2.18 2.10 2.02 1.94 1.86 1.79 1.71 1.63 1.57 1.52
0.025 1.95 1.89 1.83 1.77 1.70 1.64 1.58 1.53 1.47 1.42 1.37
0.0375 1.83 1.77 1.72 1.67 1.61 1.56 1.51 1.46 1.41 1.36 1.31
0.05
1.72 1.67 1.63 1.58 1.53 1.48 1.44 1.39 1.35 1.30 1.26
0.0625 1.62 1.59 1.54 1.50 1.46 1.42 1.37 1.33 1.29 1.25 1.21
0.075 1.54 1.51 1.47 1.43 1.40 1.35 1.32 1.28 1.24 1.21 1.17
0.10
1.39 1.37 1.34 1.31 1.28 1.25 1.22 1.18 1.15 1.12 1.09
0.15
1.17 1.16 1.14 1.12 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.03 1.01 0.99 0.96
0.20
1.01 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.85
0.30
0.79 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.70
Table 5.7. Factors of safety for downstream failure surface in each horizontal seismic
coefficient.
kh
Factors of Safety
0
1.74
0.025
1.62
0.0375
1.57
0.05
1.52
0.0625
1.48
0.075
1.43
0.10
1.35
0.15
1.21
0.20
1.09
0.30
0.909
The downstream slope factors of safety are not affected by the drawdown level.
The general shapes of the slip surface for upstream shallow failure, upstream
deep failure, and downstream failure are as shown in Fig. 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 respectively.
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Fig. 5.3 kh vs. factor of safety for shallow failure in each depth of drawdown.
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Fig. 5.4 kh vs. factor of safety for deep failure in each depth of drawdown.
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Fig. 5.5 Slip surface of typical upstream shallow failure for 10 m drawdown and kh =
0.05.

Fig. 5.6 Slip surface of typical upstream deep failure for 10 m drawdown and kh = 0.05.

Fig. 5.7 Slip surface of typical downstream failure for kh = 0.05.
The upstream slope factors of safety can be presented in two ways: each
drawdown level and each seismic coefficient value. Fig. 5.8–5.18 show the plot of kh vs.
factors of safety for each level of drawdown for the upstream slope.
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Fig. 5.8 kh vs. factors of safety for 0 m drawdown (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.9 kh vs. factors of safety for 5 m drawdown (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.10 kh vs. factors of safety for 10 m drawdown (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.11 kh vs. factors of safety for 15 m drawdown (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.12 kh vs. factors of safety for 20 m drawdown (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.13 kh vs. factors of safety for 25 m drawdown (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.14 kh vs. factors of safety for 30 m drawdown (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.15 kh vs. factors of safety for 35 m drawdown (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.16 kh vs. factors of safety for 40 m drawdown (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.17 kh vs. factors of safety for 45 m drawdown (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.18 kh vs. factors of safety for 50 m drawdown (upstream slope).
From Fig. 5.8–5.18, shallow failure has the critical factor of safety for most
scenarios. The exceptions are those in the lesser depths of drawdown level with large kh
(0 m drawdown with 0.10–0.30 kh, 5 m drawdown with 0.20–0.30 kh, 10 m and 15 m
drawdown with 0.03 kh). In those cases, the differences are not significant. It is
reasonable to conclude that for each level of drawdown at SRK Dam, upstream shallow
failure is the critical failure mode. Furthermore, the seismic coefficient which represents
the earthquake shaking has an impact on the factor of safety. Fig. 5.8–5.18 show that as
the kh value increases, the FS value decreases.
The results can be analyzed by presenting them according to each seismic
coefficient value. Fig. 5.19–5.28 show the plot of levels of drawdown vs. factors of
safety for each seismic coefficient.
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Fig. 5.19 Level of drawdown vs. factors of safety for kh = 0 (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.20 Level of drawdown vs. factors of safety for kh = 0.025 (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.21 Level of drawdown vs. factors of safety for kh = 0.0375 (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.22 Level of drawdown vs. factors of safety for kh = 0.05 (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.23 Level of drawdown vs. factors of safety for kh = 0.0625 (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.24 Level of drawdown vs. factors of safety for kh = 0.075 (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.25 Level of drawdown vs. factors of safety for kh = 0.1 (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.26 Level of drawdown vs. factors of safety for kh = 0.15 (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.27 Level of drawdown vs. factors of safety for kh = 0.20 (upstream slope).
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Fig. 5.28 Level of drawdown vs. factors of safety for kh = 0.30 (upstream slope).
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From Fig. 5.19–5.28, the majority of critical FS are those of shallow failure
surface. The exceptions are those in the higher kh with lower drawdown depths. The FS
for shallow failure surface level out at 40–50 m because the upstream +120m MSL berm
is the controlling factor. The differences in FS values of shallow and deep failure
decrease as the seismic coefficient increases. Notably in the case of kh = 0.30, the FS
from both failure modes virtually match for all drawdown depths. It is important to also
recognize that increased depth of drawdown results in decreased factors of safety.
Overall, the shallow slip surface is the critical failure for each horizontal seismic
coefficient analysis.
A visible damage on the dam crest will likely prompt dam operators to lower the
reservoir level. A tension crack with a depth of 3 m is put into the model to simulate the
damage that maybe cause by a main shock on the dam crest as shown in Fig. 5.29. This
analysis is to determine the crack’s effect on slope stability

Possible Crack Location

Fig. 5.29 Range of possible tension crack location on the dam model in GeoStudio.
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The slope stability results from the model with and without tension crack for 0 m
drawdown are compared in table 5.8.

Table 5.8. Upstream shallow failure analysis results of SRK dam with tension crack and
without tension crack for 0 m drawdown depth.
Factor of Safety
kh
Without Tension Crack
With Tension Crack
0
2.099
2.104
0.025
1.865
1.867
0.0375
1.774
1.775
0.05
1.691
1.692
0.0625
1.614
1.615
0.075
1.546
1.547
0.10
1.423
1.423
0.15
1.229
1.230
0.20
1.082
1.081
0.30
0.872
0.862
The slope stability results from the model with and without tension crack for kh =
0.05 are compared in table 5.9.
Table 5.9. Upstream shallow failure analysis results of srk dam with tension crack
and without tension crack for kh = 0.05.
Drawdown (m)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40

Factor of Safety
Without Tension Crack
With Tension Crack
1.691
1.692
1.556
1.557
1.442
1.444
1.341
1.340
1.253
1.253
1.184
1.183
1.124
1.124
1.088
1.083
1.055
1.057
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A typical slip surface for a dam model with tension crack is shown in Fig. 5.30.

Fig. 5.30 Typical slip surface for dam model with tension crack line on the crest.
While the entry point is mainly controlled by the tension crack line, the overall
shape of the slip surface remains the same. Moreover, the safety factor values remain
largely the same as the model without the tension crack, with minor differences in the
third digit. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 3 m tension crack has little to no
effect on the analysis.

5.3 Time for Drawdown at SRK Dam
The above analysis of drawdown covers a wide range of depths but has not yet
accounted for time. As calculated in section 3.2.2, the times for SRK Dam materials to be
considered 50% drained are 4–20 days for shallow failure and 35–177 days for deep
failure. From Fig. 3.9, the maximum possible drawdown depths with the initial reservoir
water level of +162 m MSL are shown in table 5.10.
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Table 5.10. SRK maximum possible drawdown depth for each rapid drawdown time.
Days
Maximum Possible Drawdown (m)
4
3
20
11
35
20
177
58*
* 58 m of drawdown is when the water level reaches the dead storage
In theory, the reservoir can be drawn down to the dead storage at +104 m MSL.
However, in practice there are a number of constraints that do not allow such drastic
release of water. As mentioned in section 3.2.3, maximum drawdown is 20 m.

5.4 Results
As discussed in chapter 4, the horizontal seismic coefficient of the largest
controlling aftershock is in the range of 0.05 to 0.1. Table 5.11 presents the factors of
safety for shallow failure within the mentioned kh range. Fig. 5.27 shows the plot of
drawdown depths vs. factors of safety for shallow failure with kh = 0.05, 0.0625, 0.075,
and 0.1.
For the upstream shallow slip surface, the maximum drawdown depth within the
rapid drawdown period is 3–11 m. From table 5.11, the factors of safety in the
drawdown range of 0–15 m are all higher than 1.1, which is the minimum required FS
for rapid drawdown shallow failures.
Factors of safety for deep failure in the same kh range are presented in table
5.12. Fig. 5.32 shows the plot of drawdown depths vs. factors of safety for deep failure
with kh = 0.05, 0.0625, 0.075, and 0.1.
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Table 5.11. Factors of safety for upstream shallow failure with kh = 0.05, 0.0625, 0.075,
and 0.1.
Factor of Safety
Drawdown (m)
kh = 0.05
kh = 0.0625
kh = 0.075
kh = 0.1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50

1.69
1.56
1.44
1.34
1.25
1.18
1.12
1.09
1.05
1.05
1.05

1.61
1.49
1.39
1.30
1.22
1.15
1.09
1.05
1.03
1.02
1.03

1.55
1.44
1.34
1.25
1.18
1.12
1.06
1.03
1.01
1.00
1.01

1.42
1.33
1.25
1.17
1.11
1.05
1.01
0.97
0.96
0.96
0.96

1.80
1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00

F.S.
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Fig. 5.31 Drawdown depths vs. factors of safety for shallow failure with kh = 0.05,
0.0625, 0.075, and 0.1.
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Table 5.12. Factors of safety for upstream deep failure with kh = 0.05, 0.0625, 0.075, and
0.1.
Factor of Safety
Drawdown (m)
kh = 0.05
kh = 0.0625
kh = 0.075
kh = 0.1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50

1.72
1.67
1.63
1.58
1.53
1.48
1.44
1.39
1.35
1.30
1.26

1.62
1.59
1.54
1.50
1.46
1.42
1.37
1.33
1.29
1.25
1.21

1.54
1.51
1.47
1.43
1.40
1.35
1.32
1.28
1.24
1.21
1.17

1.39
1.37
1.34
1.31
1.28
1.25
1.22
1.18
1.15
1.12
1.09

2.00
1.80
1.60
1.40

F.S.

1.20
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Fig. 5.32 Drawdown depths vs. factors of safety for deep failure with kh = 0.05, 0.0625,
0.075, and 0.1.
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For the upstream deep slip surface, the maximum drawdown depths within the
rapid drawdown period is 20 m. From table 5.12, the factors of safety in the drawdown
range of 0–20 m are all higher than 1.3, which is the minimum required FS for rapid
drawdown deep failures.
The factors of safety for downstream slope in the 0.05–0.1 kh range are 1.35 and
above, as shown in table 5.13. The minimum factor of safety for the downstream slope
in case of earthquake is 1.1–1.2.

Table 5.13. Factors of safety of downstream slope with kh = 0.05, 0.0625, 0.075, and 0.1.
kh
Factor of Safety
0.05
1.52
0.0625
1.48
0.075
1.43
0.1
1.35
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Rapid drawdown and seismic loading both threaten the stability of dams. The
main objective of this thesis is to identify if the event of rapid drawdown and
earthquake aftershock loading at the same time should be included in risk assessment
for embankment dams. Sirikit Dam is used in the analyses. The model was developed in
GeoStudio to analyze for the critical factor of safety in various cases of drawdown
depths and seismic loadings.
SRK Dam geometry is plotted in the program according to the as-built drawing.
The materials descriptions and properties used are a combination of existing data,
reasonable estimation, Stark and Hussain’s (2013) empirical correlation for drained fully
softened secant friction angle, and engineering judgment. The maximum rate of
drawdown for SRK reservoir is calculated using the maximum capacity of all waterreleasing structures and the minimum rate of reservoir inflow. The time for the dam
materials to drain after drawdown is calculated using the first step of the multi-stage
rapid drawdown analysis proposed by Duncan, Wright, and Wong (1990). The times for
drainage for shallow failure are 4–20 days, which has the maximum drawdown depth in
the range of 3–11 m. For deep failure, times for drainage are 35–177 days, with
maximum drawdown of 20–58 m. However, the practical level of drawdown based on
historical data is 20 m, which can be achieved in 35 days at the quickest. The effect of
rapid drawdown is only applicable for the upstream slope.
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The seismicity data of the two active faults in the nearby area are from the U.S.
Geological Survey (2007), Department of Mineral Resources of Thailand (2011), and
Seismological Bureau, Meteorological Department of Thailand (2017). From these data,
the maximum moment magnitude of each earthquake source is estimated using Wells
and Coppersmith’s (1994) empirical relationships between moment magnitude and
surface rupture length. Using Båth’s (1965) law, the largest aftershock magnitude is
estimated. Furthermore, aftershock magnitudes larger than what Båth’s law predicts are
also considered. Maximum peak ground acceleration (PGA) values are estimated from
aftershock magnitudes using the NGA-West2 Ground Motion Prediction Equations
(GMPEs) model. Horizontal seismic coefficients are determined and applied in the
SLOPE/W slope analysis.
There are some limitations of the GeoStudio functions that causes the resulting
factor of safety to be lower than it should be. Therefore, corrections are developed by
performing analyses with the same settings and applied to rapid drawdown with seismic
coefficient analysis.
The analyses are performed with a range of drawdown from 0 m to 50 m with
5 m intervals. The seismic coefficients are 0, 0.025, 0.0375, 0.05, 0.0625, 0.075, 0.1,
0.15, 0.20, and 0.30. The stability analysis results of the possible rapid drawdown and
aftershock scenario for SRK Dam is shown in tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.
The minimum factor of safety for rapid drawdown shallow failure is 1.1. From
table 6.1, all factors of safety for SRK Dam’s upstream slope are larger than the
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Table 6.1. Factors of safety for upstream shallow failure.
Factor of Safety
Drawdown (m)
kh = 0.05
kh = 0.0625
kh = 0.075
0
1.69
1.61
1.55
5
1.56
1.49
1.44
10
1.44
1.39
1.34
15
1.34
1.30
1.25

kh = 0.1
1.42
1.33
1.25
1.17

Table 6.2. Factors of safety for upstream deep failure.
Factor of Safety
Drawdown (m)
kh = 0.05
kh = 0.0625
kh = 0.075
0
1.72
1.62
1.54
5
1.67
1.59
1.51
10
1.63
1.54
1.47
15
1.58
1.50
1.43
20
1.53
1.46
1.40

kh = 0.1
1.39
1.37
1.34
1.31
1.28

Table 6.3. Factors of safety for downstream failure.
Factor of Safety
kh = 0.05
kh = 0.0625
kh = 0.075
1.52
1.48
1.43

kh = 0.1
1.35

requirement. For deep failure, the minimum factor of safety is 1.3. From table 6.2, SRK
Dam also meets the requirement. The downstream slope, which is not affected by rapid
drawdown, has a minimum factor of safety requirement for seismic shaking of 1.2. From
table 6.3, SRK downstream slope has a greater factor of safety than the requirement. In
conclusion, this research analysis shows that SRK Dam is safe from the largest possible
rapid drawdown and aftershock loading at the same time. Additionally, the result does
not suggest any modifications to the current large earthquake emergency plan.
However, it is important to note that the data and materials properties used in
this research are from reports by others. Reasonable assumptions based upon
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geotechnical principles and engineering judgement were made to achieve suitable
parameters for the analyses. Further laboratory and field investigation of geometry and
material properties are required achieve more accurate factors of safety.
From tables 6.1 and 6.2, the critical slip surface is the shallow failure for all cases.
However, the factors of safety for deep failure are not much larger than those for
shallow. The deep slip surface is an arguably more dangerous mode of failure. In field
conditions, there may be some factors that cause deep failure to mobilize before
shallow failure can occur. Therefore, deep failure should always be included in stability
analysis of dams even though it may not be the critical mode of failure.
In each level of drawdown depth, the factor of safety decreases as the seismic
coefficient increases. Similarly, in each seismic coefficient value, the factor of safety
decreases as the drawdown depth increases. It can be concluded that drawdown
condition and seismic condition have effects on each other.
Because of the size of the dam and its reservoir, lowering the water level in
practice is a slow process. It is very unlikely for SRK Dam to experience rapid drawdown
and strong aftershock shaking at the same time. However, the water level of smaller
embankment dams can fluctuate significantly. Rapid drawdown coupled with aftershock
earthquake loading can be a significant failure mode for smaller dams. Therefore, this
mode of failure should be considered for all embankment dams.
Further research may be performed on the actual probability of rapid drawdown
and aftershock, scenarios with different initial water level and outflow rate, and the
effect of deformation on the dam.
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Fig A.1 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 0 m. drawdown and kh = 0.05.

Fig A.2 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 0 m. drawdown and kh = 0.0625.

Fig A.3 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 0 m. drawdown and kh = 0.075.
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Fig A.4 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 0 m. drawdown and kh = 0.10.

Fig A.5 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 5 m. drawdown and kh = 0.05.

Fig A.6 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 5 m. drawdown and kh = 0.0625.
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Fig A.7 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 5 m. drawdown and kh = 0.075.

Fig A.8 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 5 m. drawdown and kh = 0.10.

Fig A.9 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 10 m. drawdown and kh = 0.05.
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Fig A.10 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 10 m. drawdown and kh = 0.0625.

Fig A.11 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 10 m. drawdown and kh = 0.075.

Fig A.12 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 10 m. drawdown and kh = 0.10.

93

Fig A.13 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 15 m. drawdown and kh = 0.05.

Fig A.14 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 15 m. drawdown and kh = 0.0625.

Fig A.15 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 15 m. drawdown and kh = 0.075.
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Fig A.16 Slip surface of upstream shallow failure with 15 m. drawdown and kh = 0.10.

Fig A.17 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 0 m. drawdown and kh = 0.05.

Fig A.18 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 0 m. drawdown and kh = 0.0625.
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Fig A.19 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 0 m. drawdown and kh = 0.075.

Fig A.20 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 0 m. drawdown and kh = 0.10.

Fig A.21 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 5 m. drawdown and kh = 0.05.
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Fig A.22 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 5 m. drawdown and kh = 0.0625.

Fig A.23 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 5 m. drawdown and kh = 0.075.

Fig A.24 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 5 m. drawdown and kh = 0.10.
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Fig A.25 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 10 m. drawdown and kh = 0.05.

Fig A.26 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 10 m. drawdown and kh = 0.0625.

Fig A.27 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 10 m. drawdown and kh = 0.075.
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Fig A.28 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 10 m. drawdown and kh = 0.10.

Fig A.29 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 15 m. drawdown and kh = 0.05.

Fig A.30 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 15 m. drawdown and kh = 0.0625.
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Fig A.31 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 15 m. drawdown and kh = 0.075.

Fig A.32 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 15 m. drawdown and kh = 0.10.

Fig A.33 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 20 m. drawdown and kh = 0.05.
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Fig A.34 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 20 m. drawdown and kh = 0.0625.

Fig A.35 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 20 m. drawdown and kh = 0.075.

Fig A.36 Slip surface of upstream deep failure with 20 m. drawdown and kh = 0.10.
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Fig A.37 Slip surface of downstream failure with kh = 0.05.

Fig A.38 Slip surface of downstream failure with kh = 0.0625.

Fig A.39 Slip surface of downstream failure with kh = 0.075.
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Fig A.40 Slip surface of downstream failure with kh = 0.10.

